Moscow's New "Peace Offensive' Toward Japan I
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Moscow'sPeace Offensive" Toward Japan
The Soviei Union is attempting loew dialogue with the Japanese on economic and security issues. Moscow apparently hopes to exploit differences between Japan and the United States on the proper level of Japanese defense spending. It is seekingncourage pacifist, antinuclear sentiment in Japan lo make il more difficult for the Suzuki governmeni lo convince the Japanese public of ihe need for increased defense spending. The Soviets also arc attempting to exploitistaste for economic sanctions and its differences with the United Slates over the US-Japanese trade imbalance In order to gain more access lo Japanese technology and investment. Nevertheless, the Northern Territories issueajor impediment to any significant improvement in relations. The Japanese Government is aware of Soviet objectives and is not likely to change itsand foreign policiesesult of Moscow's tactics.
TRACT
Moscow's New "Peaceoward Japan
SosietSoviets have taken several initiatives over the past five months to put a
more positive face on their poor rclaiions with Japan. The thrust of ihi* campaign has been to portray Moscowreasonable" partner with whom Tokyo should engageew dialogue. The Soviets have, at the same time, toned down their criticism of Japan's foreign policy. They also seem to havepecial effort to avoid major gaffes in their dealings with the Japanese. This approacharked departure from the USSR's frequently arrogant behavior toward Japan in the pasi.^
Soviet Premier Tikhonov's February interview in Asahi perhaps the most influential Japanese dailywas one of the most prominent actions taken in the broad "peaceikhonov reiterated,ore positive fashion, some of the themes thai Foreign Minister Gromyko, other Soviei officials, and the Soviei media have stressed in recent
President Brezhnev, speaking at Tashkent onarch, enlarged upon the Soviet position. He called on the Japanese to reconsider Moscow's proposal for confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the Farmade in Februaryreminded them that bilateral CBMs could be negotiated. The latter point had been made privately in Tokyo and Beijing last August and in subsequent Soviet commentaries. Brezhnev's statement.
' Tikhono*'i remark* were also aimed al other audiences, including the United States and China, but the choice of Asahl indicates Japan was the primary largci IB
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however, was ihe first public and authoritative proposal of such talks with the Japanese. Significantly, Brezhnev omitted the standard assertion that because the Japanese are io blame for bilateral strains, it is up to Tokyo to make the first move to improve relations. His silence on this pointew Soviet willingness io meet the Japanese part way. J
The Soviet media have followed up on Brezhnev's initiative by citing the positive responses of Japanese Diet members, trade union officials, and other public figures, as well as articles in the Japanese press. They havecharged that the main purpose of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's trip to Japan in late March was to press for increased defense spending. These commentaries have contrasted the US effort to bolster the "defense perimeter" in the Far East with Soviet "peace proposals."^
The Soviets had signaled their interest in improved relationsumber
Meanwhile, the Soviets have intensified their efforts to achieve nuclear arms curbs and security guarantees in East Asia and the Pacific. In lateide-ranging letter responding to an Australian peace movementa US-Soviet agreementimitactivities in the Pacific region. Replying in early Marchimilar appeal from Japanese intellectuals. Brezhnevpecial agreement in which Moscow would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against Japan in returnapanese commitment to adhere to its longstanding prohibition against allowing nuclear arms on its territory. Moscow has repeatedly offered assurances that il would not use nuclear weapons
1 The Soviet* have appointed Vladimir Pavlov as Polyaoskiy's successor in Tokyo
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against countries which did not produce or acquire such weapon* or allow them to be deployed on their territory, but Brezhnev's statement was the first time thai the Soviets had openly and directlyormal agreement on the matter with Japan. |
The Soviets are. al the same lime, still -stronglyongolian proposal, advanced innonaggresston pact" foe Asian and Pacific states. They abo continue to support the creationuclear-free /one in Northeast Asia. In ibis connection. Moscow has recently sent two arms control specialists to Japan where they had major interviews in Tokyo- presumably in order to bypass the government and gel Soviet views on disarmament issues on record wilh ihe Japanese public. |
Finally, the Soviets arc trying to expand economic and cultural contacts
Moscow's Motives One important motive for Ihis intensified activity is Moscow's desire to persuade Japan toore independent policy toward the United States, especially on defense mailers. The Soviets hope to exploitbetween Tokyo and Washington over the nature and extern of the Soviet threat and the consequent proper level for Japanese defense spending. The Soviets have, to this end. attempted to encourage in Japan the same pacifist, antinuclear thinking that is so much in evidence in Western Europe and. in this connection, io exploit existing concern over US nuclear policy. They apparently believe that US-Japanese differences regarding the natureestern security arrangement wilh China enhance their chances of dividing Tokyo and WashingionJH
The Soviets realizeurgeoning peace movement in Japan would make it more difficult for Suzuki to secure increased defense spending at the expense of social programs. Brezhnev's proposalnonnuclear" agreement with Japan, for example, appears designed partly to embarrass Suzuki, who is already on record against permitting nuclear weapons to transit or be based in Japan. The Prime Minister cannot accept Brezhnev's proposal withouturther strain on Japan's security relationship
wilh the United States. He will, however, find il difficult toationale for rejecting the proposal that will persuade ihe many Japanese who are opposed to nuclear arms, and he will be open to criticism by the opposition parties for failingive Brezhnev's proposal seriousJ
Suzuki in fact may be one of Moscow's targets. The Soviets, judging from Iheir press commcniaries, have been particularly annoyed by Suzuki's personal involvement in the campaign for the return of the Northern Territories, and they probably doubt that relations can be significantly improved as long as he remains in office. They may hope that, with their guidance, the peace movement in Japan will create serious difficulties for his government. Although Moscow probably has little hope thai the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will be forced from power, it may believe that another LDP leader would be preferable to Suzuki J
The Soviet "peace offensive" is only one part of Moscow's efforts to work around ihe United Stateseriod of strained bilateral relations. It is similar in several respects to recent Soviet efforts to cultivate the West Europeans. In fact. Moscow may believe that an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations would provide some encouragement for the West Europeans totand more independent of the United States in order lo case East-West tensions. Moscow's long-range goal on both fronts is for such developments ultimately to lever the United States towardore accommodating policy toward the Soviet Union. (
Another major consideration is continuing Soviet interest in gaining access to Japanese technology and persuading Japan to invest in Siberia. Indeed, Western trade restrictions and Soviet domestic economic problems make this an even more important motive for Moscow. Japan showed signs last fall of moving away from its post-Afghanistan sanctions, bul thismove was hailedesult of the introduction of martial law in Poland. The Soviets realize, however, that the Japanese have not wanted to get out in front of the West Europeans with regard lo imposing sanctions. Japan's recently announced economic measures against Poland and the USSR, which bring Japan into alignment with other US allies, probably appeared to the Soviets to be no moreeluctant concession. Thehave repeatedly emphasized in their public commentaries that ihe Japanese Government yielded to US pressure on the sanctions issue largely to reduce the likelihood of US curbs on Japanese exports. The Soviets must, at ihe same time, be aware of certain steps the Japanese have taken to limit the damage caused by their sanctions against the USSR, such as excluding the Sakhalin oil and natural gas development project. The Soviets apparently hope that they can encourage Japan loease its sanctions if they make concessions to Tokyo on minor issucs.B
The Soviets may realize their requests earlier this year for deferment of payment on products purchased from Japan will make Tokyo even warier of expanding economic ties in the absenceoncurrent political dialogue.'Nevertheless, as L'S-Japanese differences mount about how to rectify the trade imbalance, the Soviets appear to be signaling the Japanese again about their desirabi'-'vrade partner. In this connection, the USSR is stressing that its economic needs complement, rather than compete with Japanese economic goals. J
Japanese have responded cautiously to the recent Soviet initiatives and
arc convinced there has been no real change in the Soviet position on the key issues dividing the two sides. The Japanese, moreover, continue to insist that, if the USSR genuinely desires improved relations with Japan, it will have to take concrete steps to create conditions conducive to such an improvement. They have, in this connection, repeatedly mentioned the needoviet withdrawal fromeduction of Soviet forces on Japan's Northern Territories, and Soviet agreement to discuss the territorial question.^
The Soviets are not likely to budge on any of these points but could accelerate their peace campaign by actingongstanding Japanese invitation for Gromyko to visit Tokyo. They would probablylarification of Japanese intentions toward the USSR beforeate forrip. They will, at the least, want to see what actions Suzuki may takeesult of the special study on the "Soviei threat" that he requested last fall.W
The Soviets will be watching for any signs that Tokyo is interested inialogue. If they perceive such signs, they could offer minor concessions to Japan whileecisionromyko visit. They could, for example, show flexibility on such matters as procedures for visits to Japanese graves on the Norihern Islands or current restrictions on Japanese fishing in waters adjacent to that disputedew Asian arms controlan extension of Brezhnev'sroposal inalso have appeal for the Japanese^
The Soviets have not been forthcoming on such issues in the pasi. probably
Whatever blandishments the Soviets may use. the Northern Territories issue willajor impediment to improving relations, and there is little prospect of either side yielding on the issue. The locality is important both strategically andymbol of Moscow's success in undoing the embarrassing results of the Russo-Japanese War. Even more important. Moscow fearsoviet concession on this issue would encourage China and other countries to press their territorial claims against the USSR. In the absence of any major quid pro quo, no Soviet leader is likely in thefuture toerritorial adjustment with Japan. This is particularly trueeadership succession struggle is unfolding in Moscow, as no contender wants to be vulnerable to charges of being soft on national security issues.
Because ol' Moscow's intransigence on the Northern Territories issue. Ihe chances of the Soviet "peace offensive"ajor dividend for the USSR are small. Tokyo has. for example, stressed that it can hardly take Moscow's CBM proposal seriously when the Soviei Union refuses to relinquish occupied Japanese islands, the key step necessary to build Japanese confidence in the USSR. Tokyo realizes, moreover, that Moscow wants to sow discord between Japan and the United States and China, and it will not permit the Kremlin to use problems in this triangularfor its own end. The Soviet motive in encouraging pacifism and antinuclcar sentiments in Japan is similarly transparent to the Japanese Government. Prime Minister Suzuki is, in this connection, almost certain to reject Brezhnev's proposalnonnuclcar" agreement with Japan. At the same time, however. Tokyo will be continually assessing the policies of the United States and the West Europeans toward the USSR, and the Japanese will adjust their policies to those of the United States and its|
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